Sunday, December 12, 2010

Compelling Planetary Science Missions

The blog Future Planetary Exploration has a series of posts that present one view of the 5 most compelling planetary science missions from the list that the Planetary Science Decadal Survey is considering.  The posts describe missions that would most fundamentally advance our understanding of the solar system.  Using this measure, they do a good job of justifying the selection of the 4 missions described so far:

Thoughts on the Most Compelling Proposed Planetary Mission - This initial post in the series gives some background, and proposes the first of 3 missions for Mars Sample Return, the 2018 MAX-C rover, as the most compelling mission.  In spite of some skepticism about technical difficulty and cost, the opportunity to take advantage of the favorable 2018 Mars launch window, the Mars Surface Laboratory team's capabilities that would otherwise be dispersed, and the ability to work with Europe's ExoMars with subsurface sample capabilities is too tempting to pass up.

Compelling Missions - Part 2 - The Venus Climate Flagship, a scaled-down version of an ambitious Venus Flagship mission concept, is presented as the second most compelling mission.  This was posted a bit before the Decadal Survey list was released, so my interpretation is that it isn't so much a selection of the specific Venus Climate mission that's on the Survey's list, but rather that NASA would at least make some significant contribution to Venus studies, perhaps as part of a multinational Venus mission.

Compelling Missions 3 and 4: Icy Ocean Worlds - Missions to explore the icy Jovian moons and Saturn's Titan and Enceladus are next on the list.  The preference is for the Europa Jupiter System Flagship mission and one of the Enceladus orbiter missions with significant Titan capability, but

this combination would cost almost $6B.  Combine that with a $3-4B investment in Mars missions (which I predict will be the Decadal Survey's top priority) and a couple of Discovery missions, and that's pretty much the entire budget for missions next decade.  I also think that the Flagship missions may face have a couple of programmatic challenges.  First, NASA's last two choices for Flagship-scale missions, the Mars Science Laboratory and the James Webb Space Telescope, both experienced large cost overruns. ...

Several later posts look at lower-cost options to achieve some of the goals at the moons of Jupiter and Saturn.

While waiting for the last compelling mission, I decided to make my own series of "most compelling mission" posts with a different perspective.  These are supposed to be Planetary Science missions, so science return is an appropriate measure to use to compare the various missions.  However, I'd like to bring other factors into play, too.

I'd like to consider the Planetary Science missions in the context of our overall exploration and development of space.  A mission that helps NASA's human spaceflight program (whether Vision for Space Exploration, Flexible Path to Mars, or other approach) and/or traditional and new commercial space efforts will have an edge in my evaluation.  On the other hand, we are talking about Planetary Science, not Robotic Precursor missions.  Therefore, I will stick to the Decadal Survey list, which is full of missions with high-priority science content.  Planetary Science should not have to be warped beyond recognition into a substitute Robotic Precursor program just because Congress isn't wise enough to adequately fund Robotic Precursors.

For a fair comparison, I won't even consider the current 3 New Frontiers finalists (SAGE, a Venus lander mission, MoonRise, for sample return from the lunar South Pole-Aitken Basin, and OSIRIS-REx, for sample return from the asteroid 1999 RQ36), although I would otherwise be inclined to put them near or at the top of my list.

Decadal Survey: The Candy Store Posted - In order to play this game, you have to know what the proposed missions are.  This Future Planetary Exploration post gives the links and information needed to find out about the missions the Decadal Survey is evaluating.  The Decadal Survey reports are here.  The post also includes a handy table that summarizes the missions, their anticipated launch, arrival, and end dates, and a cost estimate or cost range for each mission.  Certain missions' cost estimates can be considered to be more reliable than others for various reasons (heritage, maturity of the particular mission proposal, etc), but I'll just take them as presented here.

Saturday, December 11, 2010

Twitter Account

I have a new twitter account: VisionRestore.

Also, I have some ideas for posts that have been simmering for quite a while, waiting for a chance to be written down.  I won't make any promises on when I'll finish, but I've finally started.

Tuesday, August 31, 2010

That Would Have Saved Me a Lot of Time

Summoning the Future By Remembering the Past - SpaceRef - Dennis Wingo's statement describes what I've intended, in a rather long-winded way, to say on this blog:

When the Obama administration's FY 2010 budget was introduced it was a breath of fresh air. The unsustainable Constellation program was cancelled and commercial spaceflight was embraced to support the ISS, and technology game changing missions funded that would lower the cost and provide a flexible path for exploration. However, the abandonment of a destination coupled with no real rational for what to do in Beyond Earth Orbit (BEO) exploration erased the vision (i.e. sense of purpose) part of the exploration plan.

...

The economic development of the solar system was the core value that made George W. Bush's Vision for Space Exploration exciting and worthwhile to the nation. The implementation was horribly done in the most wrong way possible. The Obama plan is the right implementation, but without the core value of economic development starting at the Moon, it is bereft of a moral underpinning.

The Obama administration's implementation is the right one, and the one that was intended with Bush's Vision for Space Exploration: make heavy use of robotic precursor missions, enable strong participation by commercial space and international partners, ensure that the effort is affordable over the long term, make steady progress, and encourage practical technology innovation.

The Flexible Path idea of performing easier deep space missions on the way to the surface of rocky worlds also makes sense. However, as distances increase, these deep space missions tend to become more difficult themselves, and to become less immediately useful in an economic sense. A hybrid of missions to the earlier, easier, and more immediately practical Flexible Path destinations done often enough to develop space infrastructure and commercial capabilities at those destinations, followed by a strong lunar surface push enabled by that infrastructure as planned in the Vision for Space Exploration, would keep the best parts of both approaches, while in the long run making the more distant deep space destinations on the Flexible Path more reachable.

The Administration's plan looks particularly strong in the area of technology - perhaps too strong for some - but this appearance could be changed simply by renaming some of the Flagship Technology Demonstrations to be simply "Missions", "Modules", and "Spacecraft". For the initial set we'd have the Space Tug spacecraft, the Inflatable Habitat ISS module, the Advanced Solar Electric Propulsion mission, and the Aerocapture mission ... and we'd still have a couple "Flagship Technology Demonstrations" as well.

Switching the Heavy Lift and Propulsion Technology effort to an affordable, modest increase in EELV or similar capabilities (e.g.: to 40-50mT to LEO) with development starting fairly soon would also give the Administration's proposal more of an operational flavor, while still leaving NASA with a strong technology portfolio.

Saturday, August 28, 2010

The Not-So-Great Compromise: Space Launch System and Multi-Purpose Crew Vehicle

In the previous posts in this series (see the tag below for the whole bunch), I speculated on what might be accomplished with a compromise between the Senate and the Administration in the Exploration areas of NASA's FY2011-FY2015 budget. My hypothetical scenario took the Senate Authorization bill as a baseline, since that bill gives some idea what would happen over several years. In particular, that bill a good idea what the Senate has in mind after the Shuttle is retired. In the other posts, I showed areas that could be made much better by shifting funds from the Senate's Heavy Lift rocket and Orion budget lines (or the Space Launch System and Multi-Purpose Crew Vehicle, as they are called in the bill). In this post, I'll look at what might happen to the HLV and astronaut spacecraft.

First, let's look at the funding that's available for the HLV and spacecraft in the Senate bill. Figures are in millions of dollars.

FY....MPCV........SLS.........Launch/Infrastructure
2011..1120........1631........428.6
2012..1400........2650........500
2013..1400........2640........400

The Launch Support and Infrastructure Modernization program is

a program the primary purpose of which is to prepare infrastructure at the Kennedy Space Center that is needed to enable processing and launch of the Space Launch System.

We are therefore justified in lumping this funding with the other SLS/MPCV budget lines.

If we project the trend here through FY2015, we have an SLS/MPCV program that would cost $21B or so over that period. That's after $10B or so invested in Constellation.

Ouch.

Now we know how the Commercial Crew, Exploration Technology Development and Demonstration, Robotic Precursor, Space Technology, and commercially-oriented KSC upgrade budgets all but vanished.

Our hypothetical example compromise reduced the SLS/MPCV budget by $1B/year, or $5B total. That still leaves about $16B dedicated to the SLS and MPCV over this period. It would still be a huge NASA effort. The question is, would cutting their budgets by this amount do the same thing to SLS/MPCV that SLS/MPCV did to Commercial Crew, Exploration Technology, Robotic Precursor, Space Technology, and the rest in the Senate budgets? I don't think so. I think we could still have a viable HLV and spacecraft program with $16B over this time period, perhaps building on some of the work already done for Constellation.

First let's take a look at some of the provisions in the bill:

Requirements in new launch and crew systems authorized in this Act should be scaled to the minimum necessary to meet the core national mission capability needed to conduct cis-lunar missions. These initial missions, along with the development of new technologies and in-space capabilities can form the foundation for missions to other destinations. These initial missions also should provide operational experience prior to the further human expansion into space. ...
It is the policy of the United States that NASA develop a Space Launch System as a follow-on to the Space Shuttle that can access cis-lunar space and the regions of space beyond low-Earth orbit in order to enable the United States to participate in global efforts to access and develop this increasingly strategic region.

In addition, the MPCV should have the

capability to conduct regular in-space operations, such as rendezvous, docking, and extra-vehicular activities, in conjunction with payloads delivered by the Space Launch System developed pursuant to section 302, or other vehicles, in preparation for missions beyond low-Earth orbit or servicing of assets described in section 804, or other assets in cis-lunar space.

This is exactly the sort of capability that I argue for in what I call "step 2", the centerpiece, of the Flexible Path to the Moon. The ability to usefully access destinations like GEO, lunar orbit, and Earth-Moon Lagrange points is crucial. Having a vehicle that allows EVAs, rendezvous and docking, servicing of space assets, and other jobs in cislunar space is a key enabler of future exploration, commerce, science, and security applications. I'm pleased the Senate focuses so much on this sort of capability, rather than Constellation which focused mainly on Ares I/Orion ISS access, causing the next step, straight to the lunar surface in decades-long slow motion, to be a leap too far. Lunar access needs to happen in a more incremental fashion, building on self-sustaining cislunar space capabilities.

I am concerned with the development cost of the SLS and MPCV and its effect on other priorities, and I am also concerned with the eventual operations costs of these systems. However, at least they are focused on appropriate goals, even if those goals might better be achieved with commercially-derived launchers such as the ideas based on EELVs. However, in the spirit of compromise, let's see if we can make this Shuttle and Orion-derived cislunar space capability work with $16B through FY2015.

The Senate bill requires

The initial capability of the core elements, without an upper stage, of lifting payloads weighing between 70 tons and 100 tons into low-Earth orbit in preparation for transit for missions beyond low-Earth orbit. ... The capability to carry an integrated upper Earth departure stage bringing the total lift capability of the Space Launch System to 130 tons or more. ... Developmental work and testing of the core elements and the upper stage should proceed in parallel subject to appropriations. Priority should be placed on the core elements with the goal for operational capability for the core elements not later than December 31, 2016.

This brings up a number of areas where the Senate could relax requirements, and thereby increase the ultimate chance of success for the SLS while allowing other programs like Robotic Precursors and Exploration Technology to function. First, the Senate could relax the December 2016 date. I don't think there's anything urgent planned that day, so why not push it back a year or 2? The same goes for the MPCV, which has similar schedule requirements.

Another item that could be postponed is the upper stage. Do we really need to work on the upper stage in parallel with the core elements? Relaxing that requirement will allow the program to concentrate on the core elements, and thus increase the chance of success in that area, while at the same time allowing other programs (potential SLS payloads in some cases?) to survive, thus removing several sources of political opposition to the SLS. The core elements should keep us busy for quite a while. The upper stage could be considered much later.

The SLS also has a requirement to launch the MPCV. The Senate could change that requirement so the SLS doesn't have to go through the expense of crew rating. The MPCV could be morphed into an in-space only vehicle, with crew space access enabled by commercial crew services.

The MPCV could be scaled back to a CRV as the Administration suggested this Spring. This could be a temporary move to allow funding for other areas, and the MPCV could later reach full functionality (as an Orion-like vehicle or an in-space only - perhaps even reusable - vehicle).

The 70 and 130 ton requirements also present a potential difficulty. They seem to lead NASA to an inline SDHLV, since the sidemount options can't reach 130 ton capability with reasonable upgrade paths. However, NASA's sidemount and inline development cost estimates (PDF; see slide page 7) are $11B and $15B, respectively, if Shuttle is cancelled. The same charts show sidemount being delivered 2 years earlier than inline, and being a low-risk development compared to what they assess to be the high risk of inline options. In addition, the sidemount has an early Block I variant that could be performing missions even earlier, and that variant could be developed for much less than the combined Block I and Block II, perhaps allowing much of the Block II development work to be done after our years of concern FY2011-FY2015. A chart from the NASASpaceflight.com article Completed SD HLV assessment highlights low-cost post-shuttle solution shows the Block I development costs as $2.5B, although there would be other costs such as KSC infrastructure work.

In the universe of Shuttle-derived HLVs, inline options have their own advantages over sidemount variants (perhaps including growth options as well as safety if crew launch is to be supported), but if we put a premium on lower development costs because we want a compromise between the Senate and Administration plans, and thus want to have more funding for Exploration Technology Demonstration and Development, Robotic Precursors, Commercial Crew, or other Administration proposals, sidemount may be preferable overall, and good enough to meet the goals of the Senate.

In short, there are many ways the Senate can relax SLS and/or MPCV requirements, including schedule, performance, and functional capabilities. Depending on which of these options are taken, doing so could leave enough funding to bring other NASA budget lines from the Senate's non-viable condition to adequate, if limited, health. Even with such a compromise, the SLS and MPCV would still have every chance to succeed and contribute to NASA's work, and in fact they may be even healthier because they might gain payloads and spacecraft technology, as well as political support, from the other budget lines.

On the other hand, a stubborn line-in-the-sand approach would likely leave the SLS and MPCV with no technology and robotic precursor payloads, no exploration technology infusion into the MPCV, numerous political enemies, impossible schedules, difficult performance requirements, and expected functionality that will have to be dropped during development.

Wednesday, August 25, 2010

The Not-So-Great Compromise: Commercial Crew

If you've been reading this series of posts from the beginning, by now you will have noticed a pattern. In the areas of the NASA budget where there is some disagreement, the Senate bills cut funding for the Administration proposals so much that those areas cannot accomplish what they are intended to accomplish. I don't intend to discuss all of them. Commercial crew is one example that deserves some discussion, though. Here's how commercial crew fares in the Administration and Senate Authorization proposals (the Senate Appropriations Committee was less favorable to Commercial Crew in the year it covered, FY2011):

FY----Administration----Senate
2011..500...............312
2012..1400..............500
2013..1400..............500
2014..1300
2015..1200

If we extrapolate the Senate's post-Shuttle, post-COTS figures, over FY2011-FY2015, Commercial Crew gets $2.3B from the Senate, and $5.8B from the Administration. That's a dramatic cut by the Senate, especially considering the concern that some members of the Senate say they have for astronaut safety. Some members of the Senate are also critical of one commercial space company in particular, but it seems that if the Senate has a Commercial Crew line but drastically underfunds it, only companies like that one with a focus of low cost will be able to compete for the money in the commercial crew line!

It should be noted that Senator Nelson has stated that the Senate's Commercial Crew funding would be stretched to FY2016, and would include the full amount requested by the Administration by then. That's a bit hard to believe. Look how far behind the Senate is by FY2013 already. Then consider that a sharp increase in Commercial Crew funding would have to come at the expense of some other program. What budget will be cut for this far-future promised Commercial Crew increase? Will it come from the SLS? Orion? I doubt it. Will the SLS or Orion suddenly need far less funding in FY2014? I doubt it. Quite the opposite is more likely. Those programs will either hit the usual schedule delays and cost overruns, or they will need to start thinking about big end-of-development costs for major tests, followed by high operations costs. The promised future Commercial Crew funds sound like Dr. Griffin's promise of commercial markets on the Moon based on government lunar infrastructure needs. That's a good idea, but when it's obvious that your particular transportation architecture isn't going to lead to government lunar infrastructure in the first place, the promise has a particularly hollow ring.

In my hypothetical improvement to the Senate's Not-So-Great "Compromise", half of the $1B/year shifted from SLS/Orion in favor of robotic precursor missions, exploration technology development and demonstrations, and commercial crew would go to the Commercial Crew line. Over 5 years this would increase the Commercial Crew amount from the Senate's $2.3B to $4.8B, which approaches the Administration's amount. If we continue Commercial Crew development funding for an additional year as suggested by Senator Nelson, and use the same funding rate, we get to $5.8B, which is the amount the Administration proposed.

Suddenly the Senate's Commercial Crew plan that is scaled to almost ensure a risky corner-cutting effort is changed to one that can support a healthy competition with both traditional and new competitors and their differing approaches. It won't be quite as fast as the Administration's original plan, and it won't have nearly as much KSC support, since in the Senate Appropriations report the 21st Century Launch Complex line must give NASA vehicles like the SLS priority, but it should enable multiple independent crew solutions that have enough funding to provide the safety and reliability features we need.

So, to sum up the last few posts, with a $1B/year shift from SLS/Orion to robotic precursors, commercial crew, and exploration technology, we should be able to turn those funding lines from completely non-viable shadows of their intended capabilities to functional, if quite limited, focused, and lean, versions of the original plan. At the same time this compromise can leave SLS/Orion in functional shape, too, as I'll discuss in the next post. Of course there is nothing magical about the $1B/year figure - others could work, too.

Does the plan give the Administration everything they want? No - it still limits and delays funds for robotic precursors, commercial crew, and exploration technology. It leaves the Space Technology line as it is now in the Senate bills. It leave Human Research as it is now in the Senate bills. It eliminates the Administration's Heavy Lift and Propulsion research and development line. It changes the purpose of the 21st Century Launch Complex line. It does all of this, but it gives the Administration some of what it wants by making some of its proposals viable. Unlike the current Senate bills, that would represent a real compromise.

Tuesday, August 24, 2010

The Not-So-Great Compromise: Exploration Technology Demonstrations and Development

Like the Robotic Precursor missions, NASA's proposed Exploration Technology and Demonstrations program includes 2 main categories of work. In this case, the 2 categories are Flagship Technology Demonstrations and Enabling Technology Development and Demonstration.

The Flagship Technology Demonstrations are major demonstrations of exploration technologies. These missions are expected to cost from $400M to $1B each. The Enabling Technology Development and Demonstration efforts are smaller (typically under $100M), and could include lab work, field tests, and even demonstrations in space.

NASA's initial FY2011 Enabling Technology Development and Demonstration (ETDD) Point of Departure Plans (PDF) included the following:

  • Lunar Volatiles Characterization - Demonstrate ISRU technology in a thermal vacuum chamber followed by testing on the Moon as part of a robotic precursor mission.
  • High Power Electric Propulsion - Demonstrate a prototype > 100 kW solar electric propulsion system in a thermal vacuum chamber with the intent to eventually demonstrating the technology in space under the Flagship Technology Demonstrations program.
  • Autonomous Precision Landing - demonstrate an autonomous landing and hazard avoidance system on Earth, perhaps using a VTVL landing vehicle as a carrying platform. This would eventually lead to a test on a body like the Moon.
  • Human Exploration Telerobotics - Demonstrate telerobotics to and from the ISS to simulate telerobotics for NEOs or Mars.
  • Fission Power Systems Technology - Demonstrate components of a 40 kW fission power system.

NASA's ambitious Flagship Technology Demonstrations Point of Departure (POD) Plans (PDF) includes an initial set of 4 missions to demonstrate 6 exploration technologies. The initial set of Flagship exploration technologies is:

  • Advanced Solar Electric Propulsion - including advanced solar arrays
  • In-Orbit Propellant Storage and Transfer
  • Lightweight/Inflatable Modules
  • Automated/Autonomous Rendezvous and Docking (AR&D)
  • Closed-Loop Life Support - demonstrated in the new module on the ISS
  • Aerocapture and/or Entry, Descent and Precision Landing

These initial technologies would be demonstrated on 4 missions:

Like the Robotic Precursor line, the Senate drastically underfunds NASA's Exploration Technology Development and Demonstration line compared to the Administration's plan. Let's compare the Administration and Senate Authorization proposals for this account. Figures are in millions of dollars:

FY----Administration----Senate
2011..652...............250
2012..1262..............437.3
2013..1808..............449
2014..2013
2015..2087

If we extend the Authorization Committee's post-Shuttle pattern to FY2015, we see that there is a about a 4-fold difference: about $7.8B in the Administration budget compared to about $2.0B in the Senate budget.

Let's see how much we can accomplish with the 2 budgets. This will require making some assumptions. Let's assume NASA doesn't scale its technology efforts to brush against the upper limits on the Flagship and Enabling programs (i.e. $1B and $100M, respectively), but when faced with the typical setbacks and delays in aerospace work, the projects wind up costing about those amounts anyway. In that case, how much can we get done with the 2 approaches?

I've described NASA's initial set of technology efforts. However, these are only the initial set. Even if we assume the 4 Flagship missions cost $1B each, and the 5 Enabling Technology efforts cost $100M each, we are still only at $4.5B of the planned $7.8B in the Administration budget. There is room for quite a few more Flagship Demonstration missions and Enabling Technology developments in that budget. Not only that, but for the later missions, the AR&D space tug vehicle will have completed a diverse set of demonstrations, so we could expect later Flagship missions that use the space tug to be cheaper or to demonstrate even more "payload" capabilities, since they likely would not have to fund development of new AR&D vehicle capabilities.

In contrast, the Senate doesn't allow us to accomplish much with this line. We could fund the initial 5 Enabling Technology efforts for $500M. We would have trouble taking successes from these efforts to the next level, though, in cases where the intent is to move the technology to a Robotic Precursor or a Flagship Technology Demonstration, since those 2 lines are drastically underfunded in the Senate bills. We could find ourselves with a number of technologies successfully demonstrated on Earth that wind up dying on the vine.

In addition to the 5 smaller ETDD efforts, we could also fund the first Flagship Technology Demonstration mission, and start funding the 2nd one. At that point, with the cost assumptions I made, we will have exhausted our funds. The first Flagship Technology Demonstration mission will have demonstrated limited autonomous rendezvous and docking capabilities, an advanced solar array system like DARPA's FAST array, and a 30 kW solar electric propulsion system. That would be the end through FY2015.

In other words, of the 6 initial technologies proposed for the Flagship line, with the Senate we will have demonstrated 1 instead of what we could expect with the Administration budget: all 6 and several more.

The advanced solar array and solar electric propulsion system should find many practical uses in commercial, military, and civil applications, unlike, say, a NASA heavy lift rocket where NASA has to maintain an expensive infrastructure whether or not it uses it. Thus, completing only FTD-1 is not a complete loss. In fact, it is the potential for such practical uses, and the associated motivation non-NASA (commercial, government, or academic) partners (in this case probably including DARPA) have to demonstrate these technologies so they are available for production use, that will provide the additional focus (and perhaps funding) that will help these missions to succeed.

However, as practical as it is, by itself, even a successful demonstrate of the solar electric propulsion and advanced solar array technology on FTD-1 will not be enough to enable cost-effective, productive, and safe BEO astronaut work. It will have nice side benefits, but by itself it will not make much difference to exploration, its main purpose.

Essentially the Senate bill as it stands would cause the exploration technology effort to fail. With that bill, we will do what we can with existing technology, and that will be the end of it.

Is there a compromise between the Senate and Administration proposals that would allow the exploration technology effort to succeed, even though the ambitions of the effort would be more limited than those that NASA originally proposed? I think there is.

Earlier, I used an example $1B/year increase in robotic precursors, commercial crew, and exploration technology over the Senate proposal at the expense of the HLV, Orion, and Shuttle budgets as a sample compromise between the Senate and Administration proposals (i.e. this would fall much closer to the Senate proposal than the Administration proposal). In this rough example, Exploration Technology received an additional $250M/year, on average, compared to the Senate bill. That leaves it with about $3B from FY2011-2015 instead of the Senate's $2B or the Administration's $7.8B. In terms of money, we aren't going far from the Senate proposal here. What can we do with $3B given the above assumptions?

With $3B instead of $2B from FY2011-FY2015, with the assumptions I made, NASA should be able to implement the 5 initial Enabling Developments for $500M, and the first 2 Flagship Technology Demonstrations, which include solar electric propulsion, advanced solar arrays, and autonomous rendezvous and docking work in the first mission, and propellant depot technology as well as additional autonomous rendezvous and docking (space tug) work in the second mission. That achieves 2 of the 6 initial Flagship technologies, and most of the 3rd (AR&D vehicle/space tug). It's starting to get better.

The remaining funds from the $3B, $500M, should be able to achieve much of the work of the 3rd Flagship mission, which includes and inflatable habitat demonstration, closed-loop life support demonstrations, and the rest of the AR&D vehicle work. Perhaps with $500M the Exploration Technology line could fund the rest of the AR&D work, finishing the 3rd Flagship objective and getting the inflatable habitat to the ISS. Is it possible to build the inflatable habitat in the FY2011-FY2015 timeframe in the first place if that's where the technology money runs out?

The FY2011-FY2015 budget outlook includes a $2B boost to the ISS budget

to fully utilize the Station’s R&D capabilities to conduct scientific research, improve our capabilities for operating in space, and demonstrate new technologies

It seems to me that the inflatable habitat demonstration on the ISS, as well as the closed-loop life support demonstrations that would take place mainly on this addition to the ISS, could be moved within this enhanced ISS budget line. All of this work adds to the Station's capabilities, uses the Station's existing R&D capabilities, and demonstrates new technologies. If this effort is a little bit too big for the enhanced ISS budget to fund, the ECLSS demonstration, which includes numerous smaller technologies, could be scaled back a bit, pieces of it could be introduced more gradually than in the original plan, or some funding could come from the rest of the exploration technology line, if any money remains there (e.g.: if the AR&D work for FTD-3 doesn't use up the $500M). A commercial inflatable habitat partner might also pitch in some funding, for example, if they were allowed some control over the inflatable habitat for non-NASA commercial revenue purposes.

If this can be arranged, we will have achieved 5 of the 6 original Flagship technology goal, perhaps with only partial credit on ECLSS. Only aerocapture remains from the initial set of Flagship technologies. I consider aerocapture to be a lower priority, since it seems to have less immediate non-NASA (i.e. commercial, DoD, etc) applicability, and thus does not help as much to build the space industry, which seems as important as developing the specific technologies themselves for exploration purposes. Also, if we are using SLS/Orion, I don't see aerocapture at Earth as the most immediate priority. Mars aerocapture may be important some day, but astronaut Mars surface missions will be very far in the future indeed if we're spending lots of money on SLS/Orion, so again aerocapture is not a near-term (i.e. next couple decades) concern.

Aerocapture could come in handy for near-term robotic science missions, so I'd suggest taking the remaining Exploration Technology funds (hopefully $100M or $200M, depending on the details of the 3rd Flagship mission funding), and encouraging a science mission to demonstrate smaller-scale aerocapture as a first step. The NASA robotic science DISCOVERY 2010 Announcement of Opportunity already includes a $10M increase on the lander mission cost cap if such a Discovery mission uses aerocapture, and a $20M increase in the cost cap on an orbiter mission if such a Discovery mission uses aerocapture. A comparatively large supplement from the Exploration Technology line could perhaps be enough to get an initial demonstration of aerocapture on a robotic science mission. This would allow us to achieve all of the initial objectives of the Flagship line, with the caveat that some ECLSS demonstrations could be delayed or forgone, and aerocapture could be demonstrated on a smaller scale than originally planned, simply by increasing the Exploration Technology budget a little bit closer to the Administration's proposal, and by using some ISS funds for work that's appropriate for it.

Of course this is still not nearly as ambitious as the original Administration plan, which included several additional, if less well-defined, technology demonstrations that would follow the first set (for example, more ambitious aerocapture and high-performance propulsion demonstrations). On the other hand, it does allow significant progress on technologies that can enable more ambitious and cost-effective astronaut missions, more ambitious and cost-effective support of astronaut missions via cargo deliveries, and a more successful space industry as NASA's commercial and government partners make use of the demonstrated exploration technologies with multiple uses. The ability to make steady progress on the original 6 Flagship missions would also give some reason to hope that those Enabling Technology developments that need a new Flagship Technology Demonstration mission to reach operational status would eventually find such a mission.

The current Senate "compromise" allows the Senate to achieve its objectives through the SLS HLV, Orion, Shuttle, and SLS-oriented KSC upgrades, but it doesn't allow the Administration to achieve its exploration technology development objectives. A modest shift from the pure Senate plan towards the Administration plan, while still keeping most of the SLS, Orion, Shuttle, and KSC upgrade funding in place as the Senate proposed, would allow much of the Administration plan to be achieved, too. Such a compromise would be advantageous for both sides, since the new exploration technologies could support the SLS and Orion while the SLS and Orion provide another reason to develop the new technologies. In addition, funding the new exploration technologies enough to make progress on them would take away a considerable amount of objection to the SLS/Orion approach from various communities (i.e. Science, Commercial Space, grass roots, etc). In other words, it's even in the interest of the SLS/Orion advocates to fund exploration technology development enough so those developments can succeed.

Friday, August 20, 2010

The Not-So-Great Compromise: Robotic Precursor Missions

In spite of the view held in some circles that "all we need is a good map", robotic precursor missions are essential if we are going to rocky destinations like the Moon, NEOs, Mars moons, or Mars, especially if we want to do so in an affordable, safe, and productive manner. We certainly do need a good map, and in fact we need many kinds of good maps. We also need much more than maps from robotic precursor missions. Example jobs for robotic precursor missions include assessing hazards to astronauts, measuring local resources, practicing use of those resources, performing various other technology demonstration tests, and evaluating potential locations for astronauts.

Let's compare the Administration and Senate Authorization proposals in terms of robotic precursor missions. Figures are in millions of dollars:

FY----Administration----Senate
2011..125...............100
2012..506...............100
2013..699...............100
2014..797
2015..923


If we extend the Authorization Committee's pattern to FY2015, we see that there is a 6-fold difference: about $3,000M in the Administration budget compared to $500M in the Senate budget.

Ouch.

NASA presented some early ideas on what they would like to do with a well-funded robotic precursor mission line. In May, during an exploration workshop, the FY 2011 Exploration Precursor Robotic Missions (xPRM) Point of Departure Plans (PDF) included:

  • a series of main robotic precursor missions ($500M - $800M each)
  • a series of small "Scout" missions ($100M - $200M each)
  • development of instruments to be flown on science missions
  • data systems, research, analysis, and sensor technology development
The initial set of proposed missions included:

FY----Large Mission----Scout----Hosted Instrument
2014..NEO Rendezvous...yes......yes
2015..Lunar Lander..............yes
2016..Mars Orbiter.....yes......yes
2017............................
yes
2018..Mars Lander......yes......yes
2019..NEO Rendezvous............yes

This would have strained the available $3B budget from 2011-2015, but if some funding from later years is counted, perhaps it could be done. Probably the most serious flaw in this series of missions is that it emphasizes Mars too much, considering that Mars is such a distant goal in NASA's exploration schedule. NASA needs to focus much more on nearer-term destinations if it wants to succeed in the earlier steps on the way to Mars. We need multiple robotic precursor missions for our next rocky destination, whether that destination is the lunar surface as described in the Flexible Path to the Moon, or NEOs as described in the Augustine Flexible Path to Mars.

A more recent presentation shows that NASA's evolving robotic precursor plans are addressing both the funding and the focus problems I just mentioned. In the Explore NEOs Objectives Workshop (Explore NOW), the robotic precursor plans presented in the updated version of Exploration Precursor Robotic Missions (xPRM) Point of Departure Plans (PDF) include:

FY----Large Mission----Scout----Hosted Instrument
2014..NEO..............NEO......yes
2015..Lunar Lander.....yes......yes
2016............................yes 2017..NEO..............yes......yes
2018..Mars.............yes......yes

One of the large Mars missions has been replaced by a NEO Scout. This makes funding the line more achievable (although still a stretch) with $3B, especially if we can count some funds in later years. In addition, the NEO missions are done sooner, allowing the results from these missions to inform astronaut NEO missions. Finally, with 3 NEO missions instead of 2 (1 of which was late in the original plan), there is a serious enough focus on NEOs to really be able to help the astronaut missions to NEOs succeed. On the Flexible Path to Mars, later robotic precursor missions could focus on the Moon or Mars and its moons, depending on what branch of that path is taken.

Ideas for the 2 main NEO missions include a NEO Telescopic Survey to identify a better selection of NEOs reachable on early deep space astronaut missions, or a NEO Rendezvous mission that could focus on a single NEO or give more high-level information about multiple NEOs using multiple small spacecraft. The 2 larger NEO missions are anticipated to cost in the $640M-$840M range through their complete life cycle.

Now let's go back to the Senate budget. Assuming their FY2011-2013 trend is kept, that budget gives $500M through FY2015. Another Senate committee's version of the budget only gives $44M in FY2011, so it would only have $444M through FY2015.

There is not enough money to run a single robotic precursor mission in the $640M-$840M class NASA envisions with the Senate budget even if that budget is projected through FY2015.

The Senate limits the robotic precursor line to 1 or 2 very small missions, 1 or 2 instruments, and supporting work like research and data systems. It acknowledges this limitation by giving the funding line the title "Robotic Precursor Instruments and Low-Cost Missions". I frequently find myself in favor of a strong emphasis on small missions, but there really needs to be a healthy mixture of smaller and larger missions.

Based on the lack of robotic precursor mission funding, my conclusion is that the Senate bills for all intents and purposes rule out any aspirations NASA might have for astronauts reaching rocky world destinations like the Moon, NEOs, Mars moons, and Mars.

Now we come to the question of compromise. Is there a viable compromise between the Administration and Senate proposals that achieves important objectives? I think there is if the Senate gives some ground on Heavy Lift rocket and Orion funding. Over the next few posts, I'll use an example of shifting a billion dollars or so per year from these lines to robotic precursors, exploration technology, and commercial crew. This would still give the Senate what it wants: funding on a massive scale for a Shuttle-derived rocket and Orion spacecraft, eventually flying astronaut missions beyond LEO. It would also allow efforts like the robotic precursor line to function, even if not as spectacularly as planned in the original FY2011 budget proposal. In my examples, I'll make a crude breakdown (ignoring details like funding profiles to match realistic project work levels over time) for the hypothetical shifted $1B/year by dividing it as follows:
  • 25% ($250M/year on average) for Robotic Precursor Missions
  • 25% ($250M/year on average) for Exploration Technology Development and Demonstrations
  • 50% ($500M/year on average) for Commercial Crew
In my examples, these amounts would be added to the original Senate plans for these 3 funding lines, thus representing a compromise between the Senate and Administration budgets.

With this budget compromise, Robotic Precursor Missions would see a dramatic increase from $500M to $1,750M from FY2011-FY2015. That doesn't come close to the Administration proposal, but it's a compromise. Can the Robotic Precursor Mission line do useful work with this amount of money? I think so. Unfortunately, that level of funding would probably require NASA to eliminate most or all robotic precursor missions to all destinations beyond their first expected destination for astronauts. If the first destination is NEOs, the plan might be cut back to something like this:

FY----Large Mission----Scout----Hosted Instrument
2014..NEO..............NEO.........
2015...............................
2016............................yes
2017..NEO..............yes.........
2018............................yes

A similar view might hold for lunar robotic precursor missions if we choose to go to the lunar surface as the first rocky destination instead of NEOs.

With missions with life cycle costs from $640M-$840M, we could squeeze a couple large missions and a couple Scouts, as long as we stay much closer to the $640M side than the $840M side for the main missions. We might have to trim some capabilities off of those missions to make sure that happens, or we might have to turn one of the bigger missions into a Scout or 2. Either way, we go from the Senate's completely non-functional Robotic Precursor plan to one that is limited, but that can help chart the course for astronaut missions.

Would this be enough for safe, cost-effective, and productive astronaut missions? I suspect it would require additional help from NASA's Planetary Science community. If NEOs are the first destination, SMD might need to set up a NEO-specific funding line similar to the existing Lunar and Mars ones. With cooperation with NASA SMD, commercial space, non-profits, and international missions, we might even be able to form a quite capable, if focused, Robotic Precursor line.

The Not-So-Great Compromise: Introduction

It's an interesting time in the NASA exploration battle that has been raging since 2005 and the introduction of the Ares rockets that eliminated most of the Vision for Space Exploration, and made the rest of that vision unattainable. The Obama Administration's proposal to emphasize technology development, commercial participation, and robotic precursor missions, all essential parts of the Vision for Space Exploration, but to do so using a Flexible Path to Mars sequence, has met with counter-proposals from the House and Senate. Most supporters of the technology/commercial/precursor approach seem to favor the Senate's proposal over the House proposal, even though the House fully funds the Administration's ambitious Space Technology line. This is probably because the House proposal essentially wipes out robotic precursors, exploration-specific technology development and demonstrations, and commercial crew transportation, while continuing the troubled Ares rockets. I won't discuss the House proposal in any more detail, since there seems to be considerable opposition to it in Congress and industry, since most of its supporters in industry seem to have no preference for it over the Senate budget, since NASA and the Administration haven't favored it, and since I personally don't find it to be credible. It has some isolated interesting ideas that may see the light of day, but as a total package it utterly fails.

Does this mean that the Senate proposals are good? I don't think so. The Senate Authorization and Appropriations bills and reports have serious flaws. The Senate bills have been described as great compromises, but as they stand they merely compromise NASA's ability to explore and encourage the development of space. However, if blended with some of the Administration proposals, the Senate bills do, perhaps, put us within reach of a NASA that can achieve important objectives on a realistic budget. Somewhere between the Senate and Administration proposals is a real compromise that is better than either extreme.

One point of view holds that both House and Senate bills are valid compromises because they give the Administration exactly what it asked for in many areas, such as keeping and vigorously using the ISS, increasing Earth Observation funding, adding Aeronautics programs to fund things like green aviation, restarting Pu-238 production, and boosting NEO search funding. However, I wouldn't characterize these agreements as compromises. Senator Hutchison, a key player in the Senate discussions, will be just as supportive of ISS funding and JSC ISS work as the Administration. The Democratic House and Senate are going to be just as inclined as the Administration to support environment-friendly programs. The other changes are small in budgetary terms. No, any compromise should be viewed strictly through the lens of the areas where there is disagreement, like technology funding, robotic precursor missions, commercial space, and government-owned heavy lift rockets. In these areas of dispute, the Senate's cuts to Administration proposals are so drastic that, in their current form, they can't be seen as compromises at all.

They can, however, be useful as starting points for a real compromise.

In the next few days I plan to discuss some of the budgetary lines in more detail so we can get an idea what a real compromise might look like. Since the Senate Authorization bill covers 3 years compared to the 1 year Senate Appropriations bill, I will focus mainly on the Authorization bill. That bill gives a better picture of where we might go over the course of years with the Senate's approach, and the 2 Senate bills are not all that different from each other anyway.

Monday, May 17, 2010

Flexible Path to the Moon: Science, Commerce, and Security at Beyond-LEO Earth Orbits

The following lists illustrate some of the science, commerce, and security activities that can take place at, or that can be enabled by capabilities at, Geosyncronous orbit and other beyond-LEO satellite orbits.

Science

  • Deploy, assemble, inspect, and/or service GEO science missions (for example, certain NASA and NOAA satellites observing Earth from GEO)

  • Inspect GEO satellites. This could include taking samples of old satellites to assess micrometeorite damage, for example. This type of analysis can also be useful for economic and security purposes.
Commerce

  • Deploy, assemble, inspect, and/or service GEO commercial missions (for example, communications satellites)

  • Enable commercial providers of satellite assembly or servicing capabilities
  • Space tourism - history or engineering tour of current or historical GEO satellites (no touching the exhibits, please)
  • jump-start capabilities that can be useful for commercial missions for other destinations (for example: fuel depots, satellite deployment, assembly, inspection, and/or servicing nodes, low-cost space access, etc)

Security

  • Deploy, assemble, inspect, and/or service GEO security missions (for example, military satellites)

  • Observe other nations' satellites

  • Jump-start capabilities that can be generally useful for security missions (for example: fuel depots, satellite deployment, assembly, inspection, and/or servicing nodes, low-cost space access, etc)

Flexible Path to the Moon: Science, Commerce, and Security at Earth-Moon Lagrange Points

The following lists illustrate some of the science, commerce, and security activities that can take place at, or that can be enabled by capabilities at, Earth-Moon Lagrange points.

Science

  • Deploy, assemble, inspect, or service Lagrange Point science missions (for example, Astrophysics or Heliophysics observatories). These could include Earth-Sun Lagrange Point science observatories assembled or serviced at Earth-Moon Lagrange Points, with the ability to transfer between assembly/servicing and operational Lagrange Points

  • Measure solar wind

  • Prepare for later science or exploration missions to the lunar surface or deep space (perhaps using exploration assembly or servicing nodes)

  • Compare ISS science results to results at Earth-Moon Lagrange Points (for example, considering Earth's magnetosphere)

Commerce

  • Encourage development of commercial services that can deploy, assemble, inspect, or service Lagrange Point science missions (for example, Astrophysics or Heliophysics observatories). These could include Earth-Sun Lagrange Point science observatories assembled or serviced at Earth-Moon Lagrange Points, with the ability to transfer between assembly/servicing and operational Lagrange Points. The capabilities developed here could be applied to commercial customers, possibly at other locations

  • Encourage the development of commercial services that can assemble exploration missions for the government

  • Encourage the development of commercial nodes at Earth-Moon Lagrange Points with the government as a customer

Security

  • Jump-start capabilities that can be useful for security missions for other destinations (for example: fuel depots, satellite deployment, assembly, inspection, and/or servicing nodes, low-cost space access, etc)

Flexible Path to the Moon: Science, Commerce, and Security in Lunar Orbit

The following lists illustrate some of the science, commerce, and security activities that can take place in, or that can be enabled by capabilities in, lunar orbit.

Science

  • Deploy, assemble, inspect, and/or service robotic lunar science missions

  • Contribute to lunar sample return missions

  • Deploy, assemble, inspect, and/or service robotic Earth observation missions for "full Earth" measurements

  • Use telerobotics for missions at the lunar surface. This can be done from Earth, but lunar orbit may provide some advantages depending on mission details: shorter communications delay (including communications relays), less requirements for communications infrastructure, more direct communications paths at times, simulation of Mars or Venus telerobotics from orbit.

  • remote sensing observations from the astronauts' spacecraft

  • test missions for operations at more distance locations (for example, Mars or Venus telerobotics, direct remote sensing, sample return, or deploying, assembling, inspecting, or servicing robotic spacecraft)

  • jump-start capabilities that can be useful for science missions for other destinations (for example: fuel depots, satellite deployment, assembly, inspection, and/or servicing nodes, low-cost space access, etc)

  • prepare for later lunar surface astronaut science missions (for example: exploration mission assembly or servicing infrastructure in lunar orbit)

Commerce

  • jump-start capabilities that can be useful for commercial missions for other destinations (for example: fuel depots, satellite deployment, assembly, inspection, and/or servicing nodes, low-cost space access, etc).

  • Space tourism at lunar orbit (for example, for lunar views)

  • Support of commercial robotics at the lunar surface

  • Prepare for later commercial lunar surface missions (for example, exploration assembly/servicing node in lunar orbit)
Security

  • jump-start capabilities that can be useful for security missions for other destinations (for example: fuel depots, satellite deployment, assembly, inspection, and/or servicing nodes, low-cost space access, etc)

Flexible Path to the Moon: Cislunar Space

This post continues yesterday's discussion on NASA's cislunar space plans on the Flexible Path to Mars by comparing those plans with those of the Flexible Path to the Moon at the same destinations.

The Flexible Path to the Moon includes three phases:
  • establishing a solid foothold in LEO with commercial and international participation as well as technology development while robotic precursors blaze an exploration trail
  • moving beyond LEO to cislunar space destinations like GEO, lunar orbit, and Earth-Moon Lagrange points
  • returning to the surface of the Moon

Each phase is intended to be self-sustaining, to produce useful economic, science, and security benefits, to develop reusable space infrastructure, and to enable more ambitious steps.

It's natural to concentrate either on the first or the last of the three steps on the Flexible Path to the Moon. The first step, establishing a foothold in LEO while robotic scouts move ahead, is our most immediate concern. In the context of the 2011 NASA budget, the NASA human spaceflight exploration work for the next several years will be entirely devoted to this step, although with a view towards the Augustine Flexible Path to Mars. Most of our near-term decisions center around this first step, so it's no surprise it's of great interest.

It's also natural to emphasize the activity that will take place on the lunar surface. The Moon is an entire world waiting to be explored and developed. Although the activities to be done on the Moon's surface would be quite different from the ones performed during the Apollo missions, Apollo gives us a conceptual framework that allows us to easily imagine what might be done there. Fiction and our experience on Earth fill in the gaps that Apollo leaves out. Not only that, but reaching the Moon is the central destination and ultimate goal of the Flexible Path to the Moon. Right?

Wrong.

In the Augustine Flexible Path to Mars, it is probably fair to say that Mars is the ultimate, central destination. The Flexible Path to Mars is about exploring new places to learn about them while getting closer to exploring and learning about Mars.

In the Flexible Path to the Moon, the Moon is actually not the ultimate, central destination, in spite of the name. The Flexible Path to the Moon is intensely focused on the Earth. It is about exploring and developing LEO, cislunar space, and the Moon for the benefit of people on Earth. This can be illustrated by considering the second step on the path, developing cislunar space.

Apollo 8's lunar flyby wasn't our goal in the 1960's. The Ares rockets weren't intended to allow astronauts to linger at cislunar space destinations or to develop infrastructure there. Even in the Augustine Flexible Path to Mars, the cislunar space destinations are treated as mere stepping stones on the way to adventuresome excursions to more distant destinations like asteroids and Mars moons.

In contrast to the Apollo, Constellation, and Flexible Path to Mars approaches that minimize beyond-LEO cislunar space destinations, the Flexible Path to the Moon treats the work that can be done and the benefits that can be gained at GEO, Earth-Moon Lagrange points, and lunar orbit as the heart of the Flexible Path to the Moon. All of the steps on this path can produce benefits for the taxpayers on Earth, but it is the intense focus on deriving economic, security, science, and other benefits from the cislunar space destinations where the Flexible Path to the Moon contrasts the most with Apollo, Constellation, and the Flexible Path to Mars.

In the Flexible Path to the Moon, cislunar space destinations "between" LEO and the lunar surface are not like the empty airspace between your departure and arrival locations on a plane trip, even though there are no rocky bodies there. These destinations are like unpopulated versions of the American West that the new nation on the Eastern seaboard (LEO in our analogy) looked forward to exploring and developing on the way towards the future great cities on the Pacific ocean (the Moon in our analogy).

In other words, cislunar space is not just a "middle-man" between LEO and the lunar surface. We don't want to skip past this step as quickly as possible on the way to the Moon, because this step not only makes the lunar surface more accessible in the long run, but it also serves the same sort of purpose that the Moon itself serves.

Here are a few observations about the activities that can be done at the cislunar space destinations:

  • Reaching these destinations is easier than reaching more distant destinations like NEOs or Mars moons. We can get there affordably and safely with considerably less capability (low-cost commercial operations, new technology, propellant depots, heavy lift, etc) than these more difficult destinations. We can also be more confident that a development effort to reach these destinations will succeed.
  • Reaching these destinations helps enable later exploration at the lunar surface.
  • Reaching these destinations and spending the considerable time and effort to make the most of these destinations before venturing beyond them helps make later exploration and development at the lunar surface more affordable, achievable, and sustainable, even though it may delay the beginning of these missions.
  • Reaching these destinations helps enable later exploration at more distant Flexible Path to Mars destinations (for example, NEOs and Mars orbit), as implied by the Augustine Committee report.
  • Reaching these destinations and spending the considerable time and effort to make the most of these destinations before venturing beyond them helps make later exploration at more distant Flexible Path to Mars destinations more affordable, achievable, and sustainable, even though it may delay the beginning of these missions.
  • Making the most of these destinations enables a wide variety of commercial space activity. This activity in turn should strengthen the space industrial base, add jobs, and enable more useful services that can be enjoyed by the taxpayer.
  • These destinations offer benefits across the spectrum of space science fields: Earth science (assembly/servicing, full-Earth data collection), Heliophysics (observatory assembly/servicing), Astrophysics (observatory assembly/servicing), Planetary Science (lunar telerobotics, lunar sample return, lunar remote sensing from astronaut spacecraft, lunar orbiting satellite assembly/servicing, preparation for astronauts at the lunar surface, test and setup for later planetary science at more distant destinations), and various ISS sciences (similar activities outside LEO).
  • The capabilities enabled and encouraged by these destinations (satellite assembly/servicing/inspection, fuel depots, reusable space infrastructure, reusable in-space transportation, etc) are highly useful for national security purposes.
  • Many of the activities at these destinations require some sort of space infrastructure like satellite servicing or exploration spacecraft assembly nodes. This may bring visions of multi-decade development efforts to build facilities like the ISS, followed by difficult logistics requirements. This need not be the case. These nodes can be considerably smaller than the ISS, and could be focused on specific tasks. Also, these nodes do not need to be permanently occupied (and given radiation considerations may very well not be), so the logistics requirements could be much easier than those of the ISS.
  • These destinations provide an interesting variation on space stations. They are harder to reach than LEO, but they have advantages, too. These destinations don't present a requirement for reboost because of atmospheric drag as the ISS orbit does. They don't have the same sort of space debris problem. Microgravity work would not have to suffer from perturbations due to Earth's imperfectly symmetrical gravity field. Instruments and materials would not suffer the same sort of weathering.

These benefits the cislunar space step are important, but what about the Moon? Even if our reach falls short and we don't get to the lunar surface sustainably during this effort, we will have accomplished much if we develop cislunar space. If we do establish ourselves on the Moon in a long-term sense, our initial efforts will still be centered on the cislunar space destinations, and thus on benefits to the people on Earth. Our mission at the lunar surface is not to do lunar surface science, although we may do some of that. It is not to set up a permanent lunar colony, although our work in this phase may bring us closer to such a colony. Our purpose on the lunar surface is to use the Moon as a force multiplier to increase our productivity at the cislunar space destinations.

This will be done in part through the demands that the lunar surface will place on the cislunar space destinations. Our capabilities and infrastructure at these destinations will need to grow to satisfy the demands of the lunar surface work.

It will also be done through the use of lunar resources. Lunar resources can help make lunar surface work affordable, but they will eventually be needed in cislunar space destinations, too. The initial cislunar assembly, servicing, and depot capabilities will be greatly enhanced through the use of these lunar resources.

The work on the lunar surface benefits the taxpayer on Earth mainly through the improvements this work enables in cislunar space. The lunar surface and cislunar space destinations become mutually supporting in a virtuous circle of sustainable and even expanding commercial, industrial, and science capabilities and infrastructure.

In the long run we may ultimately use lunar resources to make closer (i.e. LEO) or more distant (i.e. NEO, Mars moon, etc.) activities more affordable. The development of these resources may even result in a strong permanent presence on the Moon that ultimately develops its own reasons for being. However, with the Flexible Path to the Moon, this process will start by using lunar resources to address needs in cislunar space, which in turn address needs on Earth.

Sunday, May 16, 2010

Flexible Path to the Moon: NASA's Cislunar Space Plans

I'd like to discuss cislunar space destinations like lunar orbit, Earth-Moon Lagrange points, and GEO in the context of the Flexible Path to the Moon. Before doing this, however, it's useful to set the stage by considering NASA's plans for these destinations. NASA's current plans are similar to those in the Flexible Path to the Moon in many respects: a focus on commercial and international participation, strong technology development efforts, many robotic precursors, synergy with NASA's science missions and ISS, an initial focusing phase in LEO, and more. However, although both plans include missions to cislunar space, NASA's plans there are quite different from those of the Flexible Path to the Moon.

The Augustine Committee Final Report (PDF) describes the Flexible Path to Mars. This sequence of missions starts with easier beyond-LEO missions like a lunar fly-by, a lunar orbit mission, and/or an Earth-Moon Lagrange point mission. The report gives the impression that these missions are simply stepping stones towards voyages to more distant destinations with a few productive activities thrown in while we're there. The report does not give a sense of the build-up of space infrastructure or repeated visits there.

Ed Crawley from the Augustine Committee and David Mindell recently released a white paper U.S. Human Spaceflight: The FY11 Budget and the Flexible Path (PDF). This white paper confirms the impression that the Flexible Path to Mars does not have a strong cislunar space emphasis. For example, it notes:

The Augustine report envisioned initial test flights within the Earth-Moon system and then operational flights that include visits to "near earth objects" (NEOs, asteroids and spent comets), Mars flybys, Mars orbital flights and eventually exploration of the lunar and Mars surface.

The cislunar space missions are merely test flights, not operational flights. It also states:

Destinations in the Flexible Path have a logical progression. The Augustine report suggested that astronauts might first test the new systems in Earth–Moon space by traveling to lunar orbit and to the Earth-Moon Lagrange points (where the Earth and Moon’s gravity balance each other). Astronauts will then visit Earth-Sun Lagrange points, NEOs, Mars orbit and that of its moons, demonstrating new capabilities for servicing, repair, and construction along the way. These destinations and their value propositions are outlined in Figure 3.5.2-1 of the Augustine report. Additional destinations possible on the Flexible Path are geosynchronous Earth orbit (another place to demonstrate servicing) and eventually asteroids in the belt or Venus orbit.

Clearly the cislunar space destinations not seen as first-class productive and interesting destinations in their own right.

In the Remarks by the President on Space Exploration in the 21st Century, President Obama said:

Early in the next decade, a set of crewed flights will test and prove the systems required for exploration beyond low Earth orbit. And by 2025, we expect new spacecraft designed for long journeys to allow us to begin the first-ever crewed missions beyond the Moon into deep space. So we’ll start -- we’ll start by sending astronauts to an asteroid for the first time in history. By the mid-2030s, I believe we can send humans to orbit Mars and return them safely to Earth. And a landing on Mars will follow. And I expect to be around to see it.

This statement gives the impression that even though we will be going to beyond-LEO destinations like lunar orbit and/or Earth-Moon Lagrange points, and in all likelihood (one or two of) the even more distant Earth-Sun Lagrange points, we won't really be starting until we send astronauts to an asteroid.

In his prepared statements to the Senate's Committee on Commerce, Science, and Technology, NASA Administrator Bolden described the planned series of steps:

Fundamentally, the exploration of space will be a sequence of deep-space destinations for human missions matched to growing capabilities, progressing step-by-step, beginning with crewed flight tests – perhaps a circumlunar mission -- early next decade of vehicles capable of supporting exploration beyond LEO, a human mission to an asteroid by 2025, and a human mission to orbit Mars and return safely to Earth by the 2030s.

NASA clearly considers the cislunar space destinations to be useful for testing deep space exploration capabilities, which of course they are. However, NASA's cislunar space plans don't go beyond these tests. NASA's focus will be on more distant deep space exploration.

Next we will take a very different look at cislunar space in the Flexible Path to the Moon.

Friday, April 02, 2010

Flexible Path to the Moon and the 2011 NASA Budget: An Option to Start Beyond LEO Missions

The 2011 NASA budget changes I've described so far simply focus some of the budget categories more on destinations along the Flexible Path to the Moon. This allows us send robotic missions to those destinations to prepare for astronauts. It allows us to do in-space demonstrations of technologies to make astronaut missions to those destinations more affordable and capable. It allows us to place assets like serviceable satellites beyond LEO, where later they will be incentives to develop beyond-LEO astronaut capabilities. Meanwhile, the commercial LEO transport and use of the ISS continue as described in the 2011 budget.

Although this allows us to set the stage for later beyond-LEO missions as intended in step 1 of the Flexible Path to the Moon, it doesn't start us on steps 2 or 3. It leaves us without specific plans for astronaut missions to Lunar orbit, Earth-Moon Lagrange points, GEO, and the lunar surface. This causes controversy with the current NASA plan, and the approach I've outlined is similar in this respect, even though these plans replace a program that wouldn't get astronauts beyond LEO for decades.

We need to wait for results of robotic precursors, technology development and demonstrations, commercial partnerships, and international partnerships to fully achieve exploration and development of cislunar space and the lunar surface. These results will allow us to make the right decisions to complete these steps affordably. For this reason, I'm not alarmed by the postponement of exploration missions in the current plan.

However, we don't need robotic precursors to implement basic first-generation "foot-in-the-door" transport of astronauts or cargo from LEO to cislunar space destinations. We have experience with this sort of technology from Apollo, ISS, Shuttle, and numerous satellites. We don't need technology demonstrations to implement basic hardware like sensors, satellite servicing modules, pre-positioned supplies, or infrastructure letting astronauts accomplish a first set of important objectives at these destinations. We have experience with this sort of technology from the ISS, Hubble servicing, remote sensing satellites, and other missions. Budget allowing, we could start to develop some basic systems to reach and use lunar orbit, GEO, and Earth-Moon Lagrange points in the near term, and gradually bring in additional capabilities as the budget, partnerships, and demonstrated technologies allow. Thus, the 2011 NASA budget could optionally be modified to enable a first set of beyond-LEO missions.

If a commercial approach is taken, acknowledging potential beyond-LEO markets like space tourism and satellite servicing, a small initial funding line comparable to the CCDEV commercial crew effort could start the process. When the transition to the new NASA approach is well under way (i.e. we have gotten over the "Constellation Transition" and "Shuttle Slip Contingency" humps in the budget), we will have funds available to begin to develop some initial operational beyond-LEO systems. If the budget isn't increased, this might come from a moderate (perhaps 10 or 20%) cut to some of the other new budget lines. The result would still be several times larger than the $500M COTS commercial cargo incentive.

A mutually advantageous form of international participation could enable additional beyond-LEO capabilities. There could be a mixture of NASA, commercial, and international contributions.

Later, after a set of enabling technologies is developed and demonstrated, the technology lines can be scaled back to a modest long-term level to allow larger-scale operations along the Flexible Path to the Moon.

Thursday, April 01, 2010

Flexible Path to the Moon and the 2011 NASA Budget: Adjusting the Space Technology Budget

... while at the Same Time Supporting the Earth Science, Heliophysics, Astrophysics, and Planetary Science Budgets

It's interesting to consider NASA's new Space Technology budget in the context of the Flexible Path to the Moon. The Space Technology budget is meant to be "crosscutting". It's not meant to serve the needs of NASA Exploration, or NASA Science, or the space industry, or other government agencies. Instead, it's meant to serve the needs of all of these U.S. space interests. NASA technology development that isn't specific to one area and its missions falls in the general Space Technology budget.

Satellite and observatory assembly and servicing includes a broad array of crosscutting technologies. These capabilities are applicable to exploration, as they provide one type of justification for astronauts reaching achievable exploration destinations like Lagrange points, GEO, and lunar orbit, all likely locations for this type of servicing and assembly. They are also applicable to all major NASA science areas. Earth observation satellites, Heliophysics observatories, Astrophysics observatories, and remote sensing Planetary Science (e.g.: lunar orbit) probes, for example, could all potentially benefit from astronaut assembly and servicing. Robotic servicing, possibly combined with astronaut servicing, is another variant of this capability. The ISS can benefit from new servicing and assembly capabilities, and can also serve as a platform for demonstrating or even operating new servicing and assembly capabilities. Satellite servicing also has the potential to benefit other U.S. space agencies, commercial space vendors with space assets to service or with the ability to offer satellite servicing, and international partners. This sort of servicing and assembly work is "crosscutting" in many ways, and thus should be featured prominently in NASA's new Space Technology budget. If the Flexible Path to the Moon is taken, satellite and observatory assembly and servicing will take an even more prominent role, since this is one of the main drivers and benefits of reaching early Flexible Path to the Moon destinations like lunar orbit, GEO, and Earth-Moon Lagrange points.

The 2011 budget features special budget lines set aside for "Small Satellite Subsystem Technologies" and "Edison Small Satellite Demonstration Missions". Satellite and observatory assembly and servicing are similar to small satellite technologies in that they are crosscutting, multifaceted, and potentially highly practical technologies that also deserve a significant slice of the Space Technology budget pie, especially if the Flexible Path to the Moon is taken. It might make sense to create special budget lines within Space Technology for satellite servicing and assembly technologies and demonstration missions.

Some satellite servicing capabilities are well understood, and just need to be transferred to new missions on the serviced and servicing sides. It might make sense to use some of the satellite servicing "demonstration" funds to augment mainstream satellite or observatory missions by adding fairly well-understood features that make the satellites easy to service as technology demonstrations. This could benefit relatively near-term NASA Earth science, Astrophysics, Heliophysics, or Planetary Science missions, missions of other U.S. government agencies, or commercial missions like communications satellites. Demonstrations on the servicing side could take place in the near term only if the satellites are in (or can be moved to) orbits that are reachable before operational beyond-LEO missions are ready. More advanced serviceability and servicing capabilities would be handled like any other pre-demonstration Space Technology work.

Another possible way for the Space Technology budget to support the Flexible Path to the Moon is to fund space exploration technology work through the Centennial Challenges prize program. Prizes could be offered for work at destinations on the Flexible Path to the Moon. We already have the private Google Lunar X PRIZE competition as a model for this sort of opportunity. Centennial Challenge prizes that take advantage of, or that dovetail with, the work being done for that private competition might make sense. This could include variations on lunar surface work, lunar orbit work, and many other possibilities that function within the private competition's limitations on government funding for the prize-winning missions. Using services of future winners of the private competition to deploy various Space Technology products should also be considered. (There are also many similar opportunities within the new HSF Robotic Precursor budget line, especially for "Scout" missions). The Space Technology budget has a good opportunity to support crosscutting needs of NASA Exploration along the Flexible Path to the Moon and commercial and other private space organizations.

There are many other ways that the Space Technology budget can support exploration along the Flexible Path to the Moon and support other U.S. space organizations at the same time. One of the benefits of the Flexible Path to the Moon is that its exploration concentrates on destinations that have many "crosscutting" overlapping needs and benefits with other space organizations focused on science, commerce, and operational needs of the government. The Flexible Path to the Moon specifically concentrates a great deal on destinations like GEO that are mainstays of traditional space work, unlike the Flexible Path to Mars, which doesn't mention GEO and which could be interpreted to skip past other near-term destinations as quickly as possible. This attribute of the Flexible Path to the Moon allows for many crosscutting technologies in the Space Technology budget to be applied to exploration along that path while at the same time benefiting other non-exploration space organizations that use the same destinations.